Note: if the object has been read from an input stream, the only time you can be sure if isExplicit is returning the true state of affairs is if it returns false. An implicitly tagged object may appear to be explicitly tagged, so you need to understand the context under which the reading was done as well, see GetObject below.

Note: tagged objects are generally context dependent if you're trying to extract a tagged object you should be going via the appropriate GetInstance method.

1.3.6.1.4.1.22554

1.3.6.1.4.1.22554.1

1.3.6.1.4.1.22554.1.1

            CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
                                        oldWithNew   CmpCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
                                        newWithOld   CmpCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
                                        newWithNew   CmpCertificate  -- new pub signed with new priv
             }
            

            CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
            

            CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
                                             certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
                                             privateKey      [0] EncryptedValue      OPTIONAL,
                                             -- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
                                             publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL
                  }
            

            CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
                                 certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
                                 encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedValue
                      }
            

            CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
                                     caPubs       [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                                                                                        OPTIONAL,
                                     response         SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
            }
            

            CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
                                       certReqId           INTEGER,
                                       -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value
                                       -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
                                       -- corresponding request)
                                       status              PKIStatusInfo,
                                       certifiedKeyPair    CertifiedKeyPair    OPTIONAL,
                                       rspInfo             OCTET STRING        OPTIONAL
                                       -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
                                       -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF]
                        }
            

            CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
                              certHash    OCTET STRING,
                              -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
                              -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
                              certReqId   INTEGER,
                              -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
                              statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
            }
            

             Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
                             owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier  OPTIONAL,
            
                             -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
                             -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
                             -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
                             -- Challenge is to be used).
            
                             witness             OCTET STRING,
                             -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
                             -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A.  [Note that a different
                             -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
                             challenge           OCTET STRING
                             -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
                             -- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as
                             --   Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
                             --      int      INTEGER,
                             --       - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
                             --      sender   GeneralName
                             --       - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
                             --   }
                  }
             

             CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE {
                        x509v3PKCert        Certificate
                        x509v2AttrCert      [1] AttributeCertificate
              }
             

            CrlAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
            

            ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
                                   pKIStatusInfo          PKIStatusInfo,
                                   errorCode              INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
                                   -- implementation-specific error codes
                                   errorDetails           PKIFreeText       OPTIONAL
                                   -- implementation-specific error details
            }
            

            GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
            

            GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
            

               id-it-caProtEncCert    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
                  CAProtEncCertValue      ::= CMPCertificate
               id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
                 SignKeyPairTypesValue   ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
               id-it-encKeyPairTypes  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
                 EncKeyPairTypesValue    ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
               id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
                  PreferredSymmAlgValue   ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
               id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
                  CAKeyUpdateInfoValue    ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
               id-it-currentCRL       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
                  CurrentCRLValue         ::= CertificateList
               id-it-unsupportedOIDs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
                  UnsupportedOIDsValue    ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
               id-it-keyPairParamReq  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
                  KeyPairParamReqValue    ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
               id-it-keyPairParamRep  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
                  KeyPairParamRepValue    ::= AlgorithmIdentifer
               id-it-revPassphrase    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
                  RevPassphraseValue      ::= EncryptedValue
               id-it-implicitConfirm  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
                  ImplicitConfirmValue    ::= NULL
               id-it-confirmWaitTime  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
                  ConfirmWaitTimeValue    ::= GeneralizedTime
               id-it-origPKIMessage   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
                  OrigPKIMessageValue     ::= PKIMessages
               id-it-suppLangTags     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
                  SuppLangTagsValue       ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
            
             where
            
               id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
                  iso(1) identified-organization(3)
                  dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
             and
                  id-it   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
             

            InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
                                    infoType               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                                    infoValue              ANY DEFINED BY infoType  OPTIONAL
            }
            

            KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
                                    status                  PKIStatusInfo,
                                    newSigCert          [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
                                    caCerts             [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                                                      CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
                                    keyPairHist         [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                                                      CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
                         }
            

            OobCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
                                 hashAlg     [0] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL,
                                 certId      [1] CertId                  OPTIONAL,
                                 hashVal         BIT STRING
                                 -- hashVal is calculated over the Der encoding of the
                                 -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
                  }
            

             PbmParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
                                   salt                OCTET STRING,
                                   -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
                                   -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
                                   -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
                                   owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
                                   -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
                                   iterationCount      INTEGER,
                                   -- number of times the OWF is applied
                                   -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
                                   -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
                                   -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
                                   mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier
                                   -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
               }   -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
            

            PkiBody ::= CHOICE {       -- message-specific body elements
                   ir       [0]  CertReqMessages,        --Initialization Request
                   ip       [1]  CertRepMessage,         --Initialization Response
                   cr       [2]  CertReqMessages,        --Certification Request
                   cp       [3]  CertRepMessage,         --Certification Response
                   p10cr    [4]  CertificationRequest,   --imported from [PKCS10]
                   popdecc  [5]  POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
                   popdecr  [6]  POPODecKeyRespContent,  --pop Response
                   kur      [7]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Update Request
                   kup      [8]  CertRepMessage,         --Key Update Response
                   krr      [9]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Recovery Request
                   krp      [10] KeyRecRepContent,       --Key Recovery Response
                   rr       [11] RevReqContent,          --Revocation Request
                   rp       [12] RevRepContent,          --Revocation Response
                   ccr      [13] CertReqMessages,        --Cross-Cert. Request
                   ccp      [14] CertRepMessage,         --Cross-Cert. Response
                   ckuann   [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent,     --CA Key Update Ann.
                   cann     [16] CertAnnContent,         --Certificate Ann.
                   rann     [17] RevAnnContent,          --Revocation Ann.
                   crlann   [18] CRLAnnContent,          --CRL Announcement
                   pkiconf  [19] PKIConfirmContent,      --Confirmation
                   nested   [20] NestedMessageContent,   --Nested Message
                   genm     [21] GenMsgContent,          --General Message
                   genp     [22] GenRepContent,          --General Response
                   error    [23] ErrorMsgContent,        --Error Message
                   certConf [24] CertConfirmContent,     --Certificate confirm
                   pollReq  [25] PollReqContent,         --Polling request
                   pollRep  [26] PollRepContent          --Polling response
            }
            

            PkiConfirmContent ::= NULL
            

            PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
            badAlg               (0),
              -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
            badMessageCheck      (1), -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
            badRequest           (2),
              -- transaction not permitted or supported
            badTime              (3), -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, as defined by local policy
            badCertId            (4), -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
            badDataFormat        (5),
              -- the data submitted has the wrong format
            wrongAuthority       (6), -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the one creating the response token
            incorrectData        (7), -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
            missingTimeStamp     (8), -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there (by policy)
            badPOP               (9)  -- the proof-of-possession failed
            certRevoked         (10),
            certConfirmed       (11),
            wrongIntegrity      (12),
            badRecipientNonce   (13), 
            timeNotAvailable    (14),
              -- the TSA's time source is not available
            unacceptedPolicy    (15),
              -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
            unacceptedExtension (16),
              -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
            addInfoNotAvailable (17)
              -- the additional information requested could not be understood
              -- or is not available
            badSenderNonce      (18),
            badCertTemplate     (19),
            signerNotTrusted    (20),
            transactionIdInUse  (21),
            unsupportedVersion  (22),
            notAuthorized       (23),
            systemUnavail       (24),    
            systemFailure       (25),
              -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
            duplicateCertReq    (26) 
            

            PkiFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
            

             PkiHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
                       pvno                INTEGER     { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2) },
                       sender              GeneralName,
                       -- identifies the sender
                       recipient           GeneralName,
                       -- identifies the intended recipient
                       messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL,
                       -- time of production of this message (used when sender
                       -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
                       -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
                       protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL,
                       -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
                       senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
                       recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
                       -- to identify specific keys used for protection
                       transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
                       -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
                       -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
                       -- messages
                       senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
                       recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
                       -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
                       -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
                       -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
                       -- the intended recipient of this message
                       freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
                       -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
                       -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
                       generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                            InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
                       -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
                       -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
            }
            

             PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
                       pvno                INTEGER     { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2) },
                       sender              GeneralName,
                       -- identifies the sender
                       recipient           GeneralName,
                       -- identifies the intended recipient
                       messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL,
                       -- time of production of this message (used when sender
                       -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
                       -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
                       protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL,
                       -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
                       senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
                       recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
                       -- to identify specific keys used for protection
                       transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
                       -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
                       -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
                       -- messages
                       senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
                       recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
                       -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
                       -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
                       -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
                       -- the intended recipient of this message
                       freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
                       -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
                       -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
                       generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                            InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
                       -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
                       -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
            }
            

            PkiMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
                             header           PKIHeader,
                             body             PKIBody,
                             protection   [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
                             extraCerts   [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                                                                                OPTIONAL
            }
            

            PkiMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PkiMessage
            

             PkiStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
                 status        PKIStatus,                (INTEGER)
                 statusString  PkiFreeText     OPTIONAL,
                 failInfo      PkiFailureInfo  OPTIONAL  (BIT STRING)
             }
            
             PKIStatus:
               granted                (0), -- you got exactly what you asked for
               grantedWithMods        (1), -- you got something like what you asked for
               rejection              (2), -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
               waiting                (3), -- the request body part has not yet been processed, expect to hear more later
               revocationWarning      (4), -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is imminent
               revocationNotification (5), -- notification that a revocation has occurred
               keyUpdateWarning       (6)  -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in CertReqMsg
            
             PkiFailureInfo:
               badAlg           (0), -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
               badMessageCheck  (1), -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
               badRequest       (2), -- transaction not permitted or supported
               badTime          (3), -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, as defined by local policy
               badCertId        (4), -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
               badDataFormat    (5), -- the data submitted has the wrong format
               wrongAuthority   (6), -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the one creating the response token
               incorrectData    (7), -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
               missingTimeStamp (8), -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there (by policy)
               badPOP           (9)  -- the proof-of-possession failed
            
             

            PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
                    certReqId              INTEGER,
                    checkAfter             INTEGER,  -- time in seconds
                    reason                 PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
                }
            

            PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
                                   certReqId              INTEGER
            }
            

            PopoDecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
            

            PopoDecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
            

            ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
                               header    PKIHeader,
                               body      PKIBody
            }
            

            RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
                  status              PKIStatus,
                  certId              CertId,
                  willBeRevokedAt     GeneralizedTime,
                  badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime,
                  crlDetails          Extensions  OPTIONAL
                   -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
            }
            

            RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
                             certDetails         CertTemplate,
                              -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
                              -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
                              -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
                              crlEntryDetails     Extensions       OPTIONAL
                              -- requested crlEntryExtensions
                        }
            

            RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
                   status       SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
                   -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
                   revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
                   -- IDs for which revocation was requested
                   -- (same order as status)
                   crls     [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL
                   -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
              }
            

            RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
            

            Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
                attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                attrValues SET OF AttributeValue
            }
            

            Attributes ::=
              SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF Attribute -- according to RFC 5652
            

             AuthenticatedData ::= SEQUENCE {
                   version CMSVersion,
                   originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL,
                   recipientInfos RecipientInfos,
                   macAlgorithm MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm,
                   digestAlgorithm [1] DigestAlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                   encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
                   authAttrs [2] IMPLICIT AuthAttributes OPTIONAL,
                   mac MessageAuthenticationCode,
                   unauthAttrs [3] IMPLICIT UnauthAttributes OPTIONAL }
            
             AuthAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
            
             UnauthAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
            
             MessageAuthenticationCode ::= OCTET STRING
             

             AuthenticatedData ::= SEQUENCE {
                   version CMSVersion,
                   originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL,
                   recipientInfos RecipientInfos,
                   macAlgorithm MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm,
                   digestAlgorithm [1] DigestAlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                   encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
                   authAttrs [2] IMPLICIT AuthAttributes OPTIONAL,
                   mac MessageAuthenticationCode,
                   unauthAttrs [3] IMPLICIT UnauthAttributes OPTIONAL }
            
             AuthAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
            
             UnauthAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
            
             MessageAuthenticationCode ::= OCTET STRING
             

            AuthEnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {
              version CMSVersion,
              originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL,
              recipientInfos RecipientInfos,
              authEncryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
              authAttrs [1] IMPLICIT AuthAttributes OPTIONAL,
              mac MessageAuthenticationCode,
              unauthAttrs [2] IMPLICIT UnauthAttributes OPTIONAL }
            

            AuthEnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {
              version CMSVersion,
              originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL,
              recipientInfos RecipientInfos,
              authEncryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
              authAttrs [1] IMPLICIT AuthAttributes OPTIONAL,
              mac MessageAuthenticationCode,
              unauthAttrs [2] IMPLICIT UnauthAttributes OPTIONAL }
            

            CompressedData ::= Sequence {
             version CMSVersion,
             compressionAlgorithm CompressionAlgorithmIdentifier,
             encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo
            }
            

            CompressedData ::= SEQUENCE {
             version CMSVersion,
             compressionAlgorithm CompressionAlgorithmIdentifier,
             encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo
            }
            

            ContentInfo ::= Sequence {
                     contentType ContentType,
                     content
                     [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL }
            

            ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
                     contentType ContentType,
                     content
                     [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL }
            

            MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
              ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
              addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL  }
            

            EncryptedContentInfo ::= Sequence {
                contentType ContentType,
                contentEncryptionAlgorithm ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
                encryptedContent [0] IMPLICIT EncryptedContent OPTIONAL
            }
            

            EncryptedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
                contentType ContentType,
                contentEncryptionAlgorithm ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
                encryptedContent [0] IMPLICIT EncryptedContent OPTIONAL
            }
            

                  EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
                                version CMSVersion,
                                encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
                                unprotectedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnprotectedAttributes OPTIONAL }
            

            EnvelopedData ::= Sequence {
                version CMSVersion,
                originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL,
                recipientInfos RecipientInfos,
                encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
                unprotectedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnprotectedAttributes OPTIONAL
            }
            

            EnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {
                version CMSVersion,
                originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL,
                recipientInfos RecipientInfos,
                encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
                unprotectedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnprotectedAttributes OPTIONAL
            }
            

            KekIdentifier ::= Sequence {
                keyIdentifier OCTET STRING,
                date GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
                other OtherKeyAttribute OPTIONAL
            }
            

            KekRecipientInfo ::= Sequence {
                version CMSVersion,  -- always set to 4
                kekID KekIdentifier,
                keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
                encryptedKey EncryptedKey
            }
            

            KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
                issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
                rKeyId [0] IMPLICIT RecipientKeyIdentifier
            }
            

                     * KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ::= Sequence {
                     *     version CMSVersion,  -- always set to 3
                     *     originator [0] EXPLICIT OriginatorIdentifierOrKey,
                     *     ukm [1] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL,
                     *     keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
                     *     recipientEncryptedKeys RecipientEncryptedKeys
                     * }
            		 *
            		 * UserKeyingMaterial ::= OCTET STRING
                     * 

            KeyTransRecipientInfo ::= Sequence {
                version CMSVersion,  -- always set to 0 or 2
                rid RecipientIdentifier,
                keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
                encryptedKey EncryptedKey
            }
            

            MetaData ::= SEQUENCE {
              hashProtected        BOOLEAN,
              fileName             UTF8String OPTIONAL,
              mediaType            IA5String OPTIONAL,
              otherMetaData        Attributes OPTIONAL
            }
            

             OriginatorIdentifierOrKey ::= CHOICE {
                 issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
                 subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier,
                 originatorKey [1] OriginatorPublicKey
             }
            
             SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
             

            OriginatorInfo ::= Sequence {
                certs [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
                crls [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL
            }
            

            OriginatorPublicKey ::= Sequence {
                algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
                publicKey BIT STRING
            }
            

            OtherKeyAttribute ::= Sequence {
                keyAttrId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                keyAttr ANY DEFINED BY keyAttrId OPTIONAL
            }
            

            OtherRecipientInfo ::= Sequence {
               oriType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
               oriValue ANY DEFINED BY oriType }
            

            OtherRevocationInfoFormat ::= SEQUENCE {
                 otherRevInfoFormat OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                 otherRevInfo ANY DEFINED BY otherRevInfoFormat }
            

            PasswordRecipientInfo ::= Sequence {
              version CMSVersion,   -- Always set to 0
              keyDerivationAlgorithm [0] KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier
                                        OPTIONAL,
             keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
             encryptedKey EncryptedKey }
            

            RecipientEncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE {
                rid KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier,
                encryptedKey EncryptedKey
            }
            

             RecipientIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
                 issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
                 subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier
             }
            
             SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
             

            RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE {
                ktri KeyTransRecipientInfo,
                kari [1] KeyAgreeRecipientInfo,
                kekri [2] KekRecipientInfo,
                pwri [3] PasswordRecipientInfo,
                ori [4] OtherRecipientInfo }
            

             RecipientKeyIdentifier ::= Sequence {
                 subjectKeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier,
                 date GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
                 other OtherKeyAttribute OPTIONAL
             }
            
             SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
             

               ScvpReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {
               request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,
               response     ContentInfo }
            

            SignedData ::= Sequence {
                version CMSVersion,
                digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
                encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
                certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
                crls [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL,
                signerInfos SignerInfos
              }
            

            SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
                version CMSVersion,
                digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
                encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
                certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
                crls [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL,
                signerInfos SignerInfos
              }
            

             SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
                 issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
                 subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier
             }
            
             SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
             

              SignerInfo ::= Sequence {
                  version Version,
                  SignerIdentifier sid,
                  digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
                  authenticatedAttributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL,
                  digestEncryptionAlgorithm DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
                  encryptedDigest EncryptedDigest,
                  unauthenticatedAttributes [1] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL
              }
            
              EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING
            
              DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
            
              DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
             

            Time ::= CHOICE {
                        utcTime        UTCTime,
                        generalTime    GeneralizedTime }
            

            TimeStampAndCRL ::= SEQUENCE {
                timeStamp   TimeStampToken,          -- according to RFC 3161
                crl         CertificateList OPTIONAL -- according to RFC 5280
             }
            

            TimeStampedData ::= SEQUENCE {
              version              INTEGER { v1(1) },
              dataUri              IA5String OPTIONAL,
              metaData             MetaData OPTIONAL,
              content              OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
              temporalEvidence     Evidence
            }
            

            TimeStampTokenEvidence ::=
               SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF TimeStampAndCrl
            

            AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
                      type         OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                      value        ANY DEFINED BY type }
            

            CertId ::= SEQUENCE {
                            issuer           GeneralName,
                            serialNumber     INTEGER }
            

            CertReqMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertReqMsg
            

            CertReqMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
                               certReq   CertRequest,
                               pop       ProofOfPossession  OPTIONAL,
                               -- content depends upon key type
                               regInfo   SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue OPTIONAL }
            

            CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
                                 certReqId     INTEGER,          -- ID for matching request and reply
                                 certTemplate  CertTemplate,  -- Selected fields of cert to be issued
                                 controls      Controls OPTIONAL }   -- Attributes affecting issuance
            

             CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
                 version      [0] Version               OPTIONAL,
                 serialNumber [1] INTEGER               OPTIONAL,
                 signingAlg   [2] AlgorithmIdentifier   OPTIONAL,
                 issuer       [3] Name                  OPTIONAL,
                 validity     [4] OptionalValidity      OPTIONAL,
                 subject      [5] Name                  OPTIONAL,
                 publicKey    [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo  OPTIONAL,
                 issuerUID    [7] UniqueIdentifier      OPTIONAL,
                 subjectUID   [8] UniqueIdentifier      OPTIONAL,
                 extensions   [9] Extensions            OPTIONAL }
            

             CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
                 version      [0] Version               OPTIONAL,
                 serialNumber [1] INTEGER               OPTIONAL,
                 signingAlg   [2] AlgorithmIdentifier   OPTIONAL,
                 issuer       [3] Name                  OPTIONAL,
                 validity     [4] OptionalValidity      OPTIONAL,
                 subject      [5] Name                  OPTIONAL,
                 publicKey    [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo  OPTIONAL,
                 issuerUID    [7] UniqueIdentifier      OPTIONAL,
                 subjectUID   [8] UniqueIdentifier      OPTIONAL,
                 extensions   [9] Extensions            OPTIONAL }
            

            Controls  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
            

            EncKeyWithID ::= SEQUENCE {
                 privateKey           PrivateKeyInfo,
                 identifier CHOICE {
                    string               UTF8String,
                    generalName          GeneralName
                } OPTIONAL
            }
            

               EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
                   encryptedValue        EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
                   envelopedData     [0] EnvelopedData }
                   -- The encrypted private key MUST be placed in the envelopedData
                   -- encryptedContentInfo encryptedContent OCTET STRING.
            

            EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE {
                                intendedAlg   [0] AlgorithmIdentifier  OPTIONAL,
                                -- the intended algorithm for which the value will be used
                                symmAlg       [1] AlgorithmIdentifier  OPTIONAL,
                                -- the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the value
                                encSymmKey    [2] BIT STRING           OPTIONAL,
                                -- the (encrypted) symmetric key used to encrypt the value
                                keyAlg        [3] AlgorithmIdentifier  OPTIONAL,
                                -- algorithm used to encrypt the symmetric key
                                valueHint     [4] OCTET STRING         OPTIONAL,
                                -- a brief description or identifier of the encValue content
                                -- (may be meaningful only to the sending entity, and used only
                                -- if EncryptedValue might be re-examined by the sending entity
                                -- in the future)
                                encValue       BIT STRING }
                                -- the encrypted value itself
            

            OptionalValidity ::= SEQUENCE {
                                   notBefore  [0] Time OPTIONAL,
                                   notAfter   [1] Time OPTIONAL } --at least one MUST be present
            

             PkiArchiveOptions ::= CHOICE {
                 encryptedPrivKey     [0] EncryptedKey,
                 -- the actual value of the private key
                 keyGenParameters     [1] KeyGenParameters,
                 -- parameters which allow the private key to be re-generated
                 archiveRemGenPrivKey [2] BOOLEAN }
                 -- set to TRUE if sender wishes receiver to archive the private
                 -- key of a key pair that the receiver generates in response to
                 -- this request; set to FALSE if no archival is desired.
            

            PkiPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
                             action     INTEGER {
                                            dontPublish (0),
                                            pleasePublish (1) },
                             pubInfos  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SinglePubInfo OPTIONAL }
            -- pubInfos MUST NOT be present if action is "dontPublish"
            -- (if action is "pleasePublish" and pubInfos is omitted,
            -- "dontCare" is assumed)
            

            PKMACValue ::= SEQUENCE {
                 algId  AlgorithmIdentifier,
                 -- algorithm value shall be PasswordBasedMac 1.2.840.113533.7.66.13
                 -- parameter value is PBMParameter
                 value  BIT STRING }
            

            PopoPrivKey ::= CHOICE {
                   thisMessage       [0] BIT STRING,         -- Deprecated
                    -- possession is proven in this message (which contains the private
                    -- key itself (encrypted for the CA))
                   subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage,
                    -- possession will be proven in a subsequent message
                   dhMAC             [2] BIT STRING,         -- Deprecated
                   agreeMAC          [3] PKMACValue,
                   encryptedKey      [4] EnvelopedData }
            

            PopoSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE {
                                 poposkInput           [0] PopoSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL,
                                 algorithmIdentifier   AlgorithmIdentifier,
                                 signature             BIT STRING }
             -- The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the
             -- DER-encoded value of poposkInput.  NOTE: If the CertReqMsg
             -- certReq CertTemplate contains the subject and publicKey values,
             -- then poposkInput MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be
             -- computed on the DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq.  If
             -- the CertReqMsg certReq CertTemplate does not contain the public
             -- key and subject values, then poposkInput MUST be present and
             -- MUST be signed.  This strategy ensures that the public key is
             -- not present in both the poposkInput and CertReqMsg certReq
             -- CertTemplate fields.
            

            PopoSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE {
                   authInfo             CHOICE {
                                            sender              [0] GeneralName,
                                            -- used only if an authenticated identity has been
                                            -- established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a
                                            -- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate
                                            publicKeyMac        PKMacValue },
                                            -- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for
                                            -- the sender; publicKeyMac contains a password-based MAC
                                            -- on the DER-encoded value of publicKey
                   publicKey           SubjectPublicKeyInfo }  -- from CertTemplate
            

            ProofOfPossession ::= CHOICE {
                                      raVerified        [0] NULL,
                                      -- used if the RA has already verified that the requester is in
                                      -- possession of the private key
                                      signature         [1] PopoSigningKey,
                                      keyEncipherment   [2] PopoPrivKey,
                                      keyAgreement      [3] PopoPrivKey }
            

            SinglePubInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
                   pubMethod    INTEGER {
                      dontCare    (0),
                      x500        (1),
                      web         (2),
                      ldap        (3) },
                  pubLocation  GeneralName OPTIONAL }
            

             Gost28147-89-Parameters ::=
                           SEQUENCE {
                                   iv                   Gost28147-89-IV,
                                   encryptionParamSet   OBJECT IDENTIFIER
                            }
            
               Gost28147-89-IV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (8))
             

• 0 single-ASN1-type
• 1 OCTET STRING
• 2 BIT STRING

Normally in a certificate we would expect "Z" rather than "GMT", however adding the "GMT" means we can just use:

                dateF = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyyMMddHHmmssz");
            

@param time the time string.

Normally in a certificate we would expect "Z" rather than "GMT", however adding the "GMT" means we can just use:

                dateF = new SimpleDateFormat("yyMMddHHmmssz");
            

Note: In some cases, due to the local date processing, this may lead to unexpected results. If you want to stick the normal convention of 1950 to 2049 use the GetAdjustedTime() method.

            CommitmentTypeIndication ::= SEQUENCE {
                 commitmentTypeId   CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
                 commitmentTypeQualifier   SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                         CommitmentTypeQualifier OPTIONAL }
            

               CommitmentTypeQualifier ::= SEQUENCE {
                   commitmentTypeIdentifier  CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
                   qualifier          ANY DEFINED BY commitmentTypeIdentifier OPTIONAL }
             

              SignerAttribute ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
                  claimedAttributes   [0] ClaimedAttributes,
                  certifiedAttributes [1] CertifiedAttributes }
            
              ClaimedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE OF Attribute
              CertifiedAttributes ::= AttributeCertificate -- as defined in RFC 3281: see clause 4.1.
             

               SignerLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
                   countryName        [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
                   localityName       [1] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
                   postalAddress      [2] PostalAddress OPTIONAL }
            
               PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..6) OF DirectoryString
             

               SignerLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
                   countryName        [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
                   localityName       [1] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
                   postalAddress      [2] PostalAddress OPTIONAL }
            
               PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..6) OF DirectoryString
            
               DirectoryString ::= CHOICE {
                     teletexString           TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
                     printableString         PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
                     universalString         UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
                     utf8String              UTF8String (SIZE (1.. MAX)),
                     bmpString               BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX)) }
             

            ContentHints ::= SEQUENCE {
              contentDescription UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)) OPTIONAL,
              contentType ContentType }
            

            ContentIdentifier ::=  OCTET STRING
            

            EssCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
                certHash Hash,
                issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL }
            

             EssCertIDv2 ::=  SEQUENCE {
                 hashAlgorithm     AlgorithmIdentifier
                          DEFAULT {algorithm id-sha256},
                 certHash          Hash,
                 issuerSerial      IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
             }
            
             Hash ::= OCTET STRING
            
             IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
                 issuer         GeneralNames,
                 serialNumber   CertificateSerialNumber
             }
             

             OtherCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
                 otherCertHash    OtherHash,
                 issuerSerial     IssuerSerial OPTIONAL }
            
             OtherHash ::= CHOICE {
                 sha1Hash     OCTET STRING,
                 otherHash    OtherHashAlgAndValue }
            
             OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
                 hashAlgorithm    AlgorithmIdentifier,
                 hashValue        OCTET STRING }
            
             

            OtherSigningCertificate ::=  SEQUENCE {
                 certs        SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID,
                 policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
            }
            

            SigningCertificate ::=  SEQUENCE {
                 certs        SEQUENCE OF EssCertID,
                 policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
            }
            

            SigningCertificateV2 ::=  SEQUENCE {
                 certs        SEQUENCE OF EssCertIDv2,
                 policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
            }
            

If you use this interface your class should also implement the getInstance pattern which takes a tag object and the tagging mode used.

             CscaMasterList ::= SEQUENCE {
               version                CscaMasterListVersion,
               certList               SET OF Certificate }
               
             CscaMasterListVersion :: INTEGER {v0(0)}
             

             DataGroupHash  ::=  SEQUENCE {
                  dataGroupNumber         DataGroupNumber,
                  dataGroupHashValue     OCTET STRING }
            
             DataGroupNumber ::= INTEGER {
                     dataGroup1    (1),
                     dataGroup1    (2),
                     dataGroup1    (3),
                     dataGroup1    (4),
                     dataGroup1    (5),
                     dataGroup1    (6),
                     dataGroup1    (7),
                     dataGroup1    (8),
                     dataGroup1    (9),
                     dataGroup1    (10),
                     dataGroup1    (11),
                     dataGroup1    (12),
                     dataGroup1    (13),
                     dataGroup1    (14),
                     dataGroup1    (15),
                     dataGroup1    (16) }
            
             

             LDSSecurityObject ::= SEQUENCE {
               version                LDSSecurityObjectVersion,
               hashAlgorithm          DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
               dataGroupHashValues    SEQUENCE SIZE (2..ub-DataGroups) OF DataHashGroup,
               ldsVersionInfo         LDSVersionInfo OPTIONAL
                 -- if present, version MUST be v1 }
            
             DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier,
            
             LDSSecurityObjectVersion :: INTEGER {V0(0)}
             

            LDSVersionInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
               ldsVersion PRINTABLE STRING
               unicodeVersion PRINTABLE STRING
             }
            

            		DateOfCertGenSyntax ::= GeneralizedTime
             

            		ICCSNSyntax ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8..20))
             

            		PKReferenceSyntax ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(20))
             

            		RestrictionSyntax ::= DirectoryString (SIZE(1..1024))
             

            		RetrieveIfAllowed ::= BOOLEAN
             

            		CertInDirSince ::= GeneralizedTime
             

            		NameAtBirth ::= DirectoryString(SIZE(1..64)
             

                          AdditionalInformationSyntax ::= DirectoryString (SIZE(1..2048))
            

            		LiabilityLimitationFlagSyntax ::= BOOLEAN
             

                CertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
                  hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
                  certificateHash OCTET STRING
                }
            

The sequence is of type CertHash:

                 CertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
                   hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
                   certificateHash OCTET STRING
                 }
             

Returns:

                 CertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
                   hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
                   certificateHash OCTET STRING
                 }
             

ISIS-MTT-SigG: The signature act allows publishing certificates only then, when the certificate owner gives his isExplicit permission. Accordingly, there may be �nondownloadable� certificates, about which the responder must provide status information, but MUST NOT include them in the response. Clients may get therefore the following three kind of answers on a single request including the RetrieveIfAllowed extension:

• a) the responder supports the extension and is allowed to publish the certificate: RequestedCertificate returned including the requested certificate
• b) the responder supports the extension but is NOT allowed to publish the certificate: RequestedCertificate returned including an empty OCTET STRING
• c) the responder does not support the extension: RequestedCertificate is not included in the response

                       RequestedCertificate ::= CHOICE {
                         Certificate Certificate,
                         publicKeyCertificate [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,
                         attributeCertificate [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
                       }
            

Only one parameter can be given. All other must be null. @param certificate Given as Certificate Produce an object suitable for an Asn1OutputStream.

Returns:

                        RequestedCertificate ::= CHOICE {
                          Certificate Certificate,
                          publicKeyCertificate [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,
                          attributeCertificate [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
                        }
             

               AdditionalInformationSyntax ::= DirectoryString (SIZE(1..2048))
            

Returns:

               AdditionalInformationSyntax ::= DirectoryString (SIZE(1..2048))
             

                        Admissions ::= SEQUENCE
                        {
                          admissionAuthority [0] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL
                          namingAuthority [1] EXPLICIT NamingAuthority OPTIONAL
                          professionInfos SEQUENCE OF ProfessionInfo
                        }
             

             

The sequence is of type ProcurationSyntax:

                        Admissions ::= SEQUENCE
                        {
                          admissionAuthority [0] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL
                          namingAuthority [1] EXPLICIT NamingAuthority OPTIONAL
                          professionInfos SEQUENCE OF ProfessionInfo
                        }
             

Parameter professionInfos is mandatory. @param admissionAuthority The admission authority. @param namingAuthority The naming authority. @param professionInfos The profession infos. Produce an object suitable for an Asn1OutputStream.

Returns:

                   Admissions ::= SEQUENCE
                   {
                     admissionAuthority [0] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL
                     namingAuthority [1] EXPLICIT NamingAuthority OPTIONAL
                     professionInfos SEQUENCE OF ProfessionInfo
                   }
             

             

                 AdmissionSyntax ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   admissionAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
                   contentsOfAdmissions SEQUENCE OF Admissions
                 }
             

                 Admissions ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   admissionAuthority [0] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL
                   namingAuthority [1] EXPLICIT NamingAuthority OPTIONAL
                   professionInfos SEQUENCE OF ProfessionInfo
                 }
             

                 NamingAuthority ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   namingAuthorityId OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                   namingAuthorityUrl IA5String OPTIONAL,
                   namingAuthorityText DirectoryString(SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL
                 }
             

                 ProfessionInfo ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   namingAuthority [0] EXPLICIT NamingAuthority OPTIONAL,
                   professionItems SEQUENCE OF DirectoryString (SIZE(1..128)),
                   professionOIDs SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                   registrationNumber PrintableString(SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL,
                   addProfessionInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
                 }
             

ISIS-MTT PROFILE: The relatively complex structure of AdmissionSyntax supports the following concepts and requirements:

• External institutions (e.g. professional associations, chambers, unions, administrative bodies, companies, etc.), which are responsible for granting and verifying professional admissions, are indicated by means of the data field admissionAuthority. An admission authority is indicated by a GeneralName object. Here an X.501 directory name (distinguished name) can be indicated in the field directoryName, a URL address can be indicated in the field uniformResourceIdentifier, and an object identifier can be indicated in the field registeredId.
• The names of authorities which are responsible for the administration of title registers are indicated in the data field namingAuthority. The name of the authority can be identified by an object identifier in the field namingAuthorityId, by means of a text string in the field namingAuthorityText, by means of a URL address in the field namingAuthorityUrl, or by a combination of them. For example, the text string can contain the name of the authority, the country and the name of the title register. The URL-option refers to a web page which contains lists with officially registered professions (text and possibly OID) as well as further information on these professions. Object identifiers for the component namingAuthorityId are grouped under the OID-branch id-isis-at-namingAuthorities and must be applied for.
• See http://www.teletrust.de/anwend.asp?Id=30200&Sprache=E_&HomePG=0 for an application form and http://www.teletrust.de/links.asp?id=30220,11 for an overview of registered naming authorities.
• By means of the data type ProfessionInfo certain professions, specializations, disciplines, fields of activity, etc. are identified. A profession is represented by one or more text strings, resp. profession OIDs in the fields professionItems and professionOIDs and by a registration number in the field registrationNumber. An indication in text form must always be present, whereas the other indications are optional. The component addProfessionInfo may contain additional applicationspecific information in DER-encoded form.

By means of different namingAuthority-OIDs or profession OIDs hierarchies of professions, specializations, disciplines, fields of activity, etc. can be expressed. The issuing admission authority should always be indicated (field admissionAuthority), whenever a registration number is presented. Still, information on admissions can be given without indicating an admission or a naming authority by the exclusive use of the component professionItems. In this case the certification authority is responsible for the verification of the admission information.

This attribute is single-valued. Still, several admissions can be captured in the sequence structure of the component contentsOfAdmissions of AdmissionSyntax or in the component professionInfos of Admissions. The component admissionAuthority of AdmissionSyntax serves as default value for the component admissionAuthority of Admissions. Within the latter component the default value can be overwritten, in case that another authority is responsible. The component namingAuthority of Admissions serves as a default value for the component namingAuthority of ProfessionInfo. Within the latter component the default value can be overwritten, in case that another naming authority needs to be recorded.

The length of the string objects is limited to 128 characters. It is recommended to indicate a namingAuthorityURL in all issued attribute certificates. If a namingAuthorityURL is indicated, the field professionItems of ProfessionInfo should contain only registered titles. If the field professionOIDs exists, it has to contain the OIDs of the professions listed in professionItems in the same order. In general, the field professionInfos should contain only one entry, unless the admissions that are to be listed are logically connected (e.g. they have been issued under the same admission number). @see Org.BouncyCastle.Asn1.IsisMtt.X509.Admissions @see Org.BouncyCastle.Asn1.IsisMtt.X509.ProfessionInfo @see Org.BouncyCastle.Asn1.IsisMtt.X509.NamingAuthority Constructor from Asn1Sequence.

The sequence is of type ProcurationSyntax:

                 AdmissionSyntax ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   admissionAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
                   contentsOfAdmissions SEQUENCE OF Admissions
                 }
             

                 Admissions ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   admissionAuthority [0] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL
                   namingAuthority [1] EXPLICIT NamingAuthority OPTIONAL
                   professionInfos SEQUENCE OF ProfessionInfo
                 }
             

                 NamingAuthority ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   namingAuthorityId OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                   namingAuthorityUrl IA5String OPTIONAL,
                   namingAuthorityText DirectoryString(SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL
                 }
             

                 ProfessionInfo ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   namingAuthority [0] EXPLICIT NamingAuthority OPTIONAL,
                   professionItems SEQUENCE OF DirectoryString (SIZE(1..128)),
                   professionOIDs SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                   registrationNumber PrintableString(SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL,
                   addProfessionInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
                 }
             

Returns:

                 AdmissionSyntax ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   admissionAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
                   contentsOfAdmissions SEQUENCE OF Admissions
                 }
             

                 Admissions ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   admissionAuthority [0] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL
                   namingAuthority [1] EXPLICIT NamingAuthority OPTIONAL
                   professionInfos SEQUENCE OF ProfessionInfo
                 }
             

                 NamingAuthority ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   namingAuthorityId OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                   namingAuthorityUrl IA5String OPTIONAL,
                   namingAuthorityText DirectoryString(SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL
                 }
             

                 ProfessionInfo ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   namingAuthority [0] EXPLICIT NamingAuthority OPTIONAL,
                   professionItems SEQUENCE OF DirectoryString (SIZE(1..128)),
                   professionOIDs SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                   registrationNumber PrintableString(SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL,
                   addProfessionInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
                 }
             

                      DeclarationOfMajoritySyntax ::= CHOICE
                      {
                        notYoungerThan [0] IMPLICIT INTEGER,
                        fullAgeAtCountry [1] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE
                        {
                          fullAge BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
                          country PrintableString (SIZE(2))
                        }
                        dateOfBirth [2] IMPLICIT GeneralizedTime
                      }
            

fullAgeAtCountry indicates the majority of the owner with respect to the laws of a specific country. Produce an object suitable for an Asn1OutputStream.

Returns:

                       DeclarationOfMajoritySyntax ::= CHOICE
                       {
                         notYoungerThan [0] IMPLICIT INTEGER,
                         fullAgeAtCountry [1] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE
                         {
                           fullAge BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
                           country PrintableString (SIZE(2))
                         }
                         dateOfBirth [2] IMPLICIT GeneralizedTime
                       }
             

Indicates a monetary limit within which the certificate holder is authorized to act. (This value DOES NOT express a limit on the liability of the certification authority).

               MonetaryLimitSyntax ::= SEQUENCE
               {
                 currency PrintableString (SIZE(3)),
                 amount INTEGER,
                 exponent INTEGER
               }
            

currency must be the ISO code.

value = amount�10*exponent Constructor from a given details.

value = amount�10^exponent @param currency The currency. Must be the ISO code. @param amount The amount @param exponent The exponent Produce an object suitable for an Asn1OutputStream.

Returns:

                MonetaryLimitSyntax ::= SEQUENCE
                {
                  currency PrintableString (SIZE(3)),
                  amount INTEGER,
                  exponent INTEGER
                }
             

                        NamingAuthority ::= SEQUENCE 
                        {
                          namingAuthorityID OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                          namingAuthorityUrl IA5String OPTIONAL,
                          namingAuthorityText DirectoryString(SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL
                        }
            

                         NamingAuthority ::= SEQUENCE
                         {
                           namingAuthorityID OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                           namingAuthorityUrl IA5String OPTIONAL,
                           namingAuthorityText DirectoryString(SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL
                         }
             

All parameters can be combined. @param namingAuthorityID ObjectIdentifier for naming authority. @param namingAuthorityUrl URL for naming authority. @param namingAuthorityText Textual representation of naming authority. Produce an object suitable for an Asn1OutputStream.

Returns:

                         NamingAuthority ::= SEQUENCE
                         {
                           namingAuthorityID OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                           namingAuthorityUrl IA5String OPTIONAL,
                           namingAuthorityText DirectoryString(SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL
                         }
             

ISIS-MTT PROFILE: The corresponding ProcurationSyntax contains either the name of the person who is represented (subcomponent thirdPerson) or a reference to his/her base certificate (in the component signingFor, subcomponent certRef), furthermore the optional components country and typeSubstitution to indicate the country whose laws apply, and respectively the type of procuration (e.g. manager, procuration, custody).

ISIS-MTT PROFILE: The GeneralName MUST be of type directoryName and MAY only contain: - RFC3039 attributes, except pseudonym (countryName, commonName, surname, givenName, serialNumber, organizationName, organizationalUnitName, stateOrProvincename, localityName, postalAddress) and - SubjectDirectoryName attributes (title, dateOfBirth, placeOfBirth, gender, countryOfCitizenship, countryOfResidence and NameAtBirth).

                          ProcurationSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
                            country [1] EXPLICIT PrintableString(SIZE(2)) OPTIONAL,
                            typeOfSubstitution [2] EXPLICIT DirectoryString (SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL,
                            signingFor [3] EXPLICIT SigningFor 
                          }
                          
                          SigningFor ::= CHOICE 
                          { 
                            thirdPerson GeneralName,
                            certRef IssuerSerial 
                          }
            

The sequence is of type ProcurationSyntax:

                           ProcurationSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
                             country [1] EXPLICIT PrintableString(SIZE(2)) OPTIONAL,
                             typeOfSubstitution [2] EXPLICIT DirectoryString (SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL,
                             signingFor [3] EXPLICIT SigningFor
                           }
             

                           SigningFor ::= CHOICE
                           {
                             thirdPerson GeneralName,
                             certRef IssuerSerial
                           }
             

Either generalName or certRef MUST be null. @param country The country code whose laws apply. @param typeOfSubstitution The type of procuration. @param certRef Reference to certificate of the person who is represented. Constructor from a given details.

Either generalName or certRef MUST be null. @param country The country code whose laws apply. @param typeOfSubstitution The type of procuration. @param thirdPerson The GeneralName of the person who is represented. Produce an object suitable for an Asn1OutputStream.

Returns:

                           ProcurationSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
                             country [1] EXPLICIT PrintableString(SIZE(2)) OPTIONAL,
                             typeOfSubstitution [2] EXPLICIT DirectoryString (SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL,
                             signingFor [3] EXPLICIT SigningFor
                           }
             

                           SigningFor ::= CHOICE
                           {
                             thirdPerson GeneralName,
                             certRef IssuerSerial
                           }
             

                          ProfessionInfo ::= SEQUENCE 
                          {
                            namingAuthority [0] EXPLICIT NamingAuthority OPTIONAL,
                            professionItems SEQUENCE OF DirectoryString (SIZE(1..128)),
                            professionOids SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                            registrationNumber PrintableString(SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL,
                            addProfessionInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL 
                          }
            

                           ProfessionInfo ::= SEQUENCE
                           {
                             namingAuthority [0] EXPLICIT NamingAuthority OPTIONAL,
                             professionItems SEQUENCE OF DirectoryString (SIZE(1..128)),
                             professionOids SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                             registrationNumber PrintableString(SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL,
                             addProfessionInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
                           }
             

professionItems is mandatory, all other parameters are optional. @param namingAuthority The naming authority. @param professionItems Directory strings of the profession. @param professionOids DERObjectIdentfier objects for the profession. @param registrationNumber Registration number. @param addProfessionInfo Additional infos in encoded form. Produce an object suitable for an Asn1OutputStream.

Returns:

                           ProfessionInfo ::= SEQUENCE
                           {
                             namingAuthority [0] EXPLICIT NamingAuthority OPTIONAL,
                             professionItems SEQUENCE OF DirectoryString (SIZE(1..128)),
                             professionOids SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                             registrationNumber PrintableString(SIZE(1..128)) OPTIONAL,
                             addProfessionInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
                           }
             

             RestrictionSyntax ::= DirectoryString (SIZE(1..1024))
            

The DirectoryString is of type RestrictionSyntax:

                  RestrictionSyntax ::= DirectoryString (SIZE(1..1024))
             

Returns:

                  RestrictionSyntax ::= DirectoryString (SIZE(1..1024))
             

             

            cast5CBCParameters ::= Sequence {
                                      iv         OCTET STRING DEFAULT 0,
                                             -- Initialization vector
                                      keyLength  Integer
                                             -- Key length, in bits
                                 }
            

            IDEA-CBCPar ::= Sequence {
                                 iv    OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- exactly 8 octets
                             }
            

               NetscapeCertType ::= BIT STRING {
                    SSLClient               (0),
                    SSLServer               (1),
                    S/MIME                  (2),
                    Object Signing          (3),
                    Reserved                (4),
                    SSL CA                  (5),
                    S/MIME CA               (6),
                    Object Signing CA       (7) }
            

              PublicKeyAndChallenge ::= SEQUENCE {
                spki SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
                challenge IA5STRING
              }
            
              

            BasicOcspResponse       ::= Sequence {
                 tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
                 signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
                 signature            BIT STRING,
                 certs                [0] EXPLICIT Sequence OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
            

            CertID          ::=     Sequence {
                hashAlgorithm       AlgorithmIdentifier,
                issuerNameHash      OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuer's DN
                issuerKeyHash       OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuers public key
                serialNumber        CertificateSerialNumber }
            

             CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
                             good        [0]     IMPLICIT Null,
                             revoked     [1]     IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
                             unknown     [2]     IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
            

            CrlID ::= Sequence {
                crlUrl               [0]     EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
                crlNum               [1]     EXPLICIT Integer OPTIONAL,
                crlTime              [2]     EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
            

            OcspRequest     ::=     Sequence {
                tbsRequest                  TBSRequest,
                optionalSignature   [0]     EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
            

            OcspResponse ::= Sequence {
                responseStatus         OcspResponseStatus,
                responseBytes          [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
            

            OcspResponseStatus ::= Enumerated {
                successful            (0),  --Response has valid confirmations
                malformedRequest      (1),  --Illegal confirmation request
                internalError         (2),  --Internal error in issuer
                tryLater              (3),  --Try again later
                                            --(4) is not used
                sigRequired           (5),  --Must sign the request
                unauthorized          (6)   --Request unauthorized
            }
            

            Request         ::=     Sequence {
                reqCert                     CertID,
                singleRequestExtensions     [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
            

            ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
                 byName          [1] Name,
                 byKey           [2] KeyHash }
            

            ResponseBytes ::=       Sequence {
                responseType   OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                response       OCTET STRING }
            

            ResponseData ::= Sequence {
                version              [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
                responderID              ResponderID,
                producedAt               GeneralizedTime,
                responses                Sequence OF SingleResponse,
                responseExtensions   [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
            

            RevokedInfo ::= Sequence {
                 revocationTime              GeneralizedTime,
                 revocationReason    [0]     EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
            

            ServiceLocator ::= Sequence {
                issuer    Name,
                locator   AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax OPTIONAL }
            

            Signature       ::=     Sequence {
                signatureAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier,
                signature               BIT STRING,
                certs               [0] EXPLICIT Sequence OF Certificate OPTIONAL}
            

             SingleResponse ::= Sequence {
                     certID                       CertID,
                     certStatus                   CertStatus,
                     thisUpdate                   GeneralizedTime,
                     nextUpdate         [0]       EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
                     singleExtensions   [1]       EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
            

            TBSRequest      ::=     Sequence {
                version             [0]     EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
                requestorName       [1]     EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
                requestList                 Sequence OF Request,
                requestExtensions   [2]     EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
            

            Attr ::= Sequence {
                attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                attrValues Set OF AttributeValue
            }
            

            CertificationRequest ::= Sequence {
              certificationRequestInfo  CertificationRequestInfo,
              signatureAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier{{ SignatureAlgorithms }},
              signature                 BIT STRING
            }
            

              CertificationRequestInfo ::= Sequence {
               version             Integer { v1(0) } (v1,...),
               subject             Name,
               subjectPKInfo   SubjectPublicKeyInfo{{ PKInfoAlgorithms }},
               attributes          [0] Attributes{{ CRIAttributes }}
              }
            
              Attributes { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::= Set OF Attr{{ IOSet }}
            
              Attr { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::= Sequence {
                type    ATTRIBUTE.&id({IOSet}),
                values  Set SIZE(1..MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type({IOSet}{\@type})
              }
             

            ContentInfo ::= Sequence {
                     contentType ContentType,
                     content
                     [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL }
            

                  EncryptedData ::= Sequence {
                       version Version,
                       encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo
                  }
            
            
                  EncryptedContentInfo ::= Sequence {
                      contentType ContentType,
                      contentEncryptionAlgorithm  ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
                      encryptedContent [0] IMPLICIT EncryptedContent OPTIONAL
                }
            
                EncryptedContent ::= OCTET STRING
             

             EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo ::= Sequence {
                  encryptionAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier {{KeyEncryptionAlgorithms}},
                  encryptedData EncryptedData
             }
            
             EncryptedData ::= OCTET STRING
            
             KeyEncryptionAlgorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
                      ... -- For local profiles
             }
             

            MacData ::= SEQUENCE {
                mac      DigestInfo,
                macSalt  OCTET STRING,
                iterations INTEGER DEFAULT 1
                -- Note: The default is for historic reasons and its use is deprecated. A
                -- higher value, like 1024 is recommended.
            

              [IMPLICIT TAGS]
            
              OneAsymmetricKey ::= SEQUENCE {
                  version                   Version,
                  privateKeyAlgorithm       PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
                  privateKey                PrivateKey,
                  attributes            [0] Attributes OPTIONAL,
                  ...,
                  [[2: publicKey        [1] PublicKey OPTIONAL ]],
                  ...
              }
            
              PrivateKeyInfo ::= OneAsymmetricKey
            
              Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1) } (v1, ..., v2)
            
              PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
                                                 { PUBLIC-KEY,
                                                   { PrivateKeyAlgorithms } }
            
              PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
                                 -- Content varies based on type of key.  The
                                 -- algorithm identifier dictates the format of
                                 -- the key.
            
              PublicKey ::= BIT STRING
                                 -- Content varies based on type of key.  The
                                 -- algorithm identifier dictates the format of
                                 -- the key.
            
              Attributes ::= SET OF Attribute { { OneAsymmetricKeyAttributes } }
              

              RSAES-OAEP-params ::= SEQUENCE {
                 hashAlgorithm      [0] OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms     DEFAULT sha1,
                 maskGenAlgorithm   [1] PKCS1MGFAlgorithms  DEFAULT mgf1SHA1,
                 pSourceAlgorithm   [2] PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms  DEFAULT pSpecifiedEmpty
               }
            
               OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
                 { OID id-sha1 PARAMETERS NULL   }|
                 { OID id-sha256 PARAMETERS NULL }|
                 { OID id-sha384 PARAMETERS NULL }|
                 { OID id-sha512 PARAMETERS NULL },
                 ...  -- Allows for future expansion --
               }
               PKCS1MGFAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
                 { OID id-mgf1 PARAMETERS OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms },
                ...  -- Allows for future expansion --
               }
               PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
                 { OID id-pSpecified PARAMETERS OCTET STRING },
                 ...  -- Allows for future expansion --
              }
             

                  RsaPrivateKey ::= Sequence {
                                      version Version,
                                      modulus Integer, -- n
                                      publicExponent Integer, -- e
                                      privateExponent Integer, -- d
                                      prime1 Integer, -- p
                                      prime2 Integer, -- q
                                      exponent1 Integer, -- d mod (p-1)
                                      exponent2 Integer, -- d mod (q-1)
                                      coefficient Integer -- (inverse of q) mod p
                                  }
            
                  Version ::= Integer
             

This routine is written to output Pkcs1 version 0, private keys.

             RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE {
               hashAlgorithm      [0] OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms  DEFAULT sha1,
                maskGenAlgorithm   [1] PKCS1MGFAlgorithms  DEFAULT mgf1SHA1,
                saltLength         [2] INTEGER  DEFAULT 20,
                trailerField       [3] TrailerField  DEFAULT trailerFieldBC
              }
            
             OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
                { OID id-sha1 PARAMETERS NULL   }|
                { OID id-sha256 PARAMETERS NULL }|
                { OID id-sha384 PARAMETERS NULL }|
                { OID id-sha512 PARAMETERS NULL },
                ...  -- Allows for future expansion --
             }
            
             PKCS1MGFAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
               { OID id-mgf1 PARAMETERS OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms },
                ...  -- Allows for future expansion --
             }
            
             TrailerField ::= INTEGER { trailerFieldBC(1) }
             

             SignedData ::= Sequence {
                 version Version,
                 digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
                 contentInfo ContentInfo,
                 certificates
                     [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates
                              OPTIONAL,
                 crls
                     [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL,
                 signerInfos SignerInfos }
            

              SignerInfo ::= Sequence {
                  version Version,
                  issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
                  digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
                  authenticatedAttributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL,
                  digestEncryptionAlgorithm DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
                  encryptedDigest EncryptedDigest,
                  unauthenticatedAttributes [1] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL
              }
            
              EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING
            
              DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
            
              DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
             

            SMIMECapabilities ::= Sequence OF SMIMECapability
            

            SMIMECapability ::= Sequence {
                capabilityID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                parameters ANY DEFINED BY capabilityID OPTIONAL
            }
            

            SmimeEncryptionKeyPreference ::= CHOICE {
                issuerAndSerialNumber   [0] IssuerAndSerialNumber,
                receipentKeyId          [1] RecipientKeyIdentifier,
                subjectAltKeyIdentifier [2] SubjectKeyIdentifier
            }
            

            Accuracy ::= SEQUENCE {
                        seconds        INTEGER              OPTIONAL,
                        millis     [0] INTEGER  (1..999)    OPTIONAL,
                        micros     [1] INTEGER  (1..999)    OPTIONAL
                        }
            

               MessageImprint ::= SEQUENCE  {
                  hashAlgorithm                AlgorithmIdentifier,
                  hashedMessage                OCTET STRING  }
            

            TimeStampReq ::= SEQUENCE  {
             version                      INTEGER  { v1(1) },
             messageImprint               MessageImprint,
               --a hash algorithm OID and the hash value of the data to be
               --time-stamped
             reqPolicy             TSAPolicyId              OPTIONAL,
             nonce                 INTEGER                  OPTIONAL,
             certReq               BOOLEAN                  DEFAULT FALSE,
             extensions            [0] IMPLICIT Extensions  OPTIONAL
            }
            

            TimeStampResp ::= SEQUENCE  {
              status                  PkiStatusInfo,
              timeStampToken          TimeStampToken     OPTIONAL  }
            

            
                 TstInfo ::= SEQUENCE  {
                    version                      INTEGER  { v1(1) },
                    policy                       TSAPolicyId,
                    messageImprint               MessageImprint,
                      -- MUST have the same value as the similar field in
                      -- TimeStampReq
                    serialNumber                 INTEGER,
                     -- Time-Stamping users MUST be ready to accommodate integers
                     -- up to 160 bits.
                    genTime                      GeneralizedTime,
                    accuracy                     Accuracy                 OPTIONAL,
                    ordering                     BOOLEAN             DEFAULT FALSE,
                    nonce                        INTEGER                  OPTIONAL,
                      -- MUST be present if the similar field was present
                      -- in TimeStampReq.  In that case it MUST have the same value.
                    tsa                          [0] GeneralName          OPTIONAL,
                    extensions                   [1] IMPLICIT Extensions   OPTIONAL  }
            
             

             DirectoryString ::= CHOICE {
               teletexString               TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
               printableString             PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
               universalString             UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)),
               utf8String                  UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)),
               bmpString                   BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX))  }
            

            AccessDescription  ::=  SEQUENCE {
                  accessMethod          OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                  accessLocation        GeneralName  }
            

                 AlgorithmIdentifier ::= Sequence {
                                       algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                                       parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL }
            

             AttCertIssuer ::= CHOICE {
                  v1Form   GeneralNames,  -- MUST NOT be used in this
                                          -- profile
                  v2Form   [0] V2Form     -- v2 only
             }
            

             AttCertValidityPeriod  ::= Sequence {
                  notBeforeTime  GeneralizedTime,
                  notAfterTime   GeneralizedTime
             }
            

            Attr ::= Sequence {
                attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                attrValues Set OF AttributeValue
            }
            

             AttributeCertificate ::= Sequence {
                  acinfo               AttributeCertificateInfo,
                  signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
                  signatureValue       BIT STRING
             }
            

              AttributeCertificateInfo ::= Sequence {
                   version              AttCertVersion -- version is v2,
                   holder               Holder,
                   issuer               AttCertIssuer,
                   signature            AlgorithmIdentifier,
                   serialNumber         CertificateSerialNumber,
                   attrCertValidityPeriod   AttCertValidityPeriod,
                   attributes           Sequence OF Attr,
                   issuerUniqueID       UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                   extensions           Extensions OPTIONAL
              }
            
              AttCertVersion ::= Integer { v2(1) }
             

             id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 }
            
             AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax  ::=
                  Sequence SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription
             AccessDescription  ::=  Sequence {
                   accessMethod          OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                   accessLocation        GeneralName  }
            
             id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
             id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 }
             id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 }
             

             id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 35 }
            
               AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= Sequence {
                  keyIdentifier             [0] IMPLICIT KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
                  authorityCertIssuer       [1] IMPLICIT GeneralNames            OPTIONAL,
                  authorityCertSerialNumber [2] IMPLICIT CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL  }
            
               KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
             

            	     *   SubjectPublicKeyInfo apki = new SubjectPublicKeyInfo((ASN1Sequence)new ASN1InputStream(
            		 *       publicKey.getEncoded()).readObject());
                     *   AuthorityKeyIdentifier aki = new AuthorityKeyIdentifier(apki);
                     * 

            BasicConstraints := Sequence {
               cA                  Boolean DEFAULT FALSE,
               pathLenConstraint   Integer (0..MAX) OPTIONAL
            }
            

             CertificateList  ::=  Sequence  {
                  tbsCertList          TbsCertList,
                  signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
                  signatureValue       BIT STRING  }
             

                 crossCertificatePairATTRIBUTE::={
                   WITH SYNTAX   CertificatePair
                   EQUALITY MATCHING RULE certificatePairExactMatch
                   ID joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) crossCertificatePair(40)}
             

The forward elements of the crossCertificatePair attribute of a CA's directory entry shall be used to store all, except self-issued certificates issued to this CA. Optionally, the reverse elements of the crossCertificatePair attribute, of a CA's directory entry may contain a subset of certificates issued by this CA to other CAs. When both the forward and the reverse elements are present in a single attribute value, issuer name in one certificate shall match the subject name in the other and vice versa, and the subject public key in one certificate shall be capable of verifying the digital signature on the other certificate and vice versa. When a reverse element is present, the forward element value and the reverse element value need not be stored in the same attribute value; in other words, they can be stored in either a single attribute value or two attribute values.

                   CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE {
                     forward		[0]	Certificate OPTIONAL,
                     reverse		[1]	Certificate OPTIONAL,
                     -- at least one of the pair shall be present -- }
             

The sequence is of type CertificatePair:

                   CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE {
                     forward		[0]	Certificate OPTIONAL,
                     reverse		[1]	Certificate OPTIONAL,
                     -- at least one of the pair shall be present -- }
             

Returns:

                   CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE {
                     forward		[0]	Certificate OPTIONAL,
                     reverse		[1]	Certificate OPTIONAL,
                     -- at least one of the pair shall be present -- }
             

            CertificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE {1..MAX} OF PolicyInformation
            

                 CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
             

            CrlDistPoint ::= Sequence SIZE {1..MAX} OF DistributionPoint
            

            CRLNumber::= Integer(0..MAX)
            

            CRLReason ::= Enumerated {
             unspecified             (0),
             keyCompromise           (1),
             cACompromise            (2),
             affiliationChanged      (3),
             superseded              (4),
             cessationOfOperation    (5),
             certificateHold         (6),
             removeFromCRL           (8),
             privilegeWithdrawn      (9),
             aACompromise           (10)
            }
            

            DigestInfo::=Sequence{
                     digestAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier,
                     digest OCTET STRING }
            

It stores a string in a chosen encoding.

             DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
                  ia5String        IA5String      (SIZE (1..200)),
                  visibleString    VisibleString  (SIZE (1..200)),
                  bmpString        BMPString      (SIZE (1..200)),
                  utf8String       UTF8String     (SIZE (1..200)) }
             

Useful when reading back a DisplayText class from it's Asn1Encodable form.

            DistributionPoint ::= Sequence {
                 distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
                 reasons           [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
                 cRLIssuer         [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL
            }
            

            DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
                fullName                 [0] GeneralNames,
                nameRelativeToCRLIssuer  [1] RDN
            }
            

                 extendedKeyUsage ::= Sequence SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
            

             GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
                  otherName                       [0]     OtherName,
                  rfc822Name                      [1]     IA5String,
                  dNSName                         [2]     IA5String,
                  x400Address                     [3]     ORAddress,
                  directoryName                   [4]     Name,
                  ediPartyName                    [5]     EDIPartyName,
                  uniformResourceIdentifier       [6]     IA5String,
                  iPAddress                       [7]     OCTET STRING,
                  registeredID                    [8]     OBJECT IDENTIFIER}
            
             OtherName ::= Sequence {
                  type-id    OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                  value      [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
            
             EDIPartyName ::= Sequence {
                  nameAssigner            [0]     DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
                  partyName               [1]     DirectoryString }
             

This constructor can handle:

• rfc822Name
• iPAddress
• directoryName
• dNSName
• uniformResourceIdentifier
• registeredID

Note: A directory name can be encoded in different ways into a byte representation. Be aware of this if the byte representation is used for comparing results.

            GeneralNames ::= Sequence SIZE {1..MAX} OF GeneralName
            

            
                   GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE
                   {
                     baseName                    GeneralName,
                     minimum         [0]     BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
                     maximum         [1]     BaseDistance OPTIONAL
                   }
             

If minimum is null, zero is assumed, if maximum is null, maximum is absent.

                   GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE
                   {
                     baseName                    GeneralName,
                     minimum         [0]     BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
                     maximum         [1]     BaseDistance OPTIONAL
                   }
             

For an v2 attribute certificate this is:

                       Holder ::= SEQUENCE {
                             baseCertificateID   [0] IssuerSerial OPTIONAL,
                                      -- the issuer and serial number of
                                      -- the holder's Public Key Certificate
                             entityName          [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
                                      -- the name of the claimant or role
                             objectDigestInfo    [2] ObjectDigestInfo OPTIONAL
                                      -- used to directly authenticate the holder,
                                      -- for example, an executable
                       }
            

For an v1 attribute certificate this is:

                    subject CHOICE {
                     baseCertificateID [0] IssuerSerial,
                     -- associated with a Public Key Certificate
                     subjectName [1] GeneralNames },
                     -- associated with a name
            

             Holder ::= Sequence {
                   baseCertificateID   [0] IssuerSerial OPTIONAL,
                            -- the issuer and serial number of
                            -- the holder's Public Key Certificate
                   entityName          [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
                            -- the name of the claimant or role
                   objectDigestInfo    [2] ObjectDigestInfo OPTIONAL
                            -- used to directly authenticate the holder,
                            -- for example, an executable
             }
            

            
              IetfAttrSyntax ::= Sequence {
                policyAuthority [0] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
                values Sequence OF CHOICE {
                  octets OCTET STRING,
                  oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                  string UTF8String
                }
              }
            
             

             IssuerSerial  ::=  Sequence {
                  issuer         GeneralNames,
                  serial         CertificateSerialNumber,
                  issuerUid      UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL
             }
            

            IssuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { 
              distributionPoint          [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, 
              onlyContainsUserCerts      [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, 
              onlyContainsCACerts        [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, 
              onlySomeReasons            [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, 
              indirectCRL                [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
              onlyContainsAttributeCerts [5] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE }
            

                KeyPurposeID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            

                id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 15 }
            
                KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
                     digitalSignature        (0),
                     nonRepudiation          (1),
                     keyEncipherment         (2),
                     dataEncipherment        (3),
                     keyAgreement            (4),
                     keyCertSign             (5),
                     cRLSign                 (6),
                     encipherOnly            (7),
                     decipherOnly            (8) }
             

permitted and excluded are Vectors of GeneralSubtree objects.

              NoticeReference ::= Sequence {
                  organization     DisplayText,
                  noticeNumbers    Sequence OF Integer }
            
             

Useful for reconstructing a NoticeReference instance from its encodable/encoded form.

             
               ObjectDigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
                    digestedObjectType  ENUMERATED {
                            publicKey            (0),
                            publicKeyCert        (1),
                            otherObjectTypes     (2) },
                                    -- otherObjectTypes MUST NOT
                                    -- be used in this profile
                    otherObjectTypeID   OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                    digestAlgorithm     AlgorithmIdentifier,
                    objectDigest        BIT STRING
               }
              
            

If digestedObjectType is not {@link #publicKeyCert} or {@link #publicKey} otherObjectTypeID must be given, otherwise it is ignored.

             
               ObjectDigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
                    digestedObjectType  ENUMERATED {
                            publicKey            (0),
                            publicKeyCert        (1),
                            otherObjectTypes     (2) },
                                    -- otherObjectTypes MUST NOT
                                    -- be used in this profile
                    otherObjectTypeID   OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
                    digestAlgorithm     AlgorithmIdentifier,
                    objectDigest        BIT STRING
               }
              
            

                PolicyMappings ::= Sequence SIZE (1..MAX) OF Sequence {
                  issuerDomainPolicy      CertPolicyId,
                  subjectDomainPolicy     CertPolicyId }
             

                id-qt          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-pkix 2 }
                id-qt-cps      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-qt 1 }
                id-qt-unotice  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-qt 2 }
              PolicyQualifierId ::=
                   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice )
             

               PolicyQualifierInfo ::= Sequence {
                   policyQualifierId  PolicyQualifierId,
                   qualifier          ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }
             

            BiometricData  ::=  SEQUENCE {
                  typeOfBiometricData  TypeOfBiometricData,
                  hashAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,
                  biometricDataHash    OCTET STRING,
                  sourceDataUri        IA5String OPTIONAL  }
            

            Iso4217CurrencyCode  ::=  CHOICE {
                  alphabetic              PrintableString (SIZE 3), --Recommended
                  numeric              INTEGER (1..999) }
            -- Alphabetic or numeric currency code as defined in ISO 4217
            -- It is recommended that the Alphabetic form is used
            

            MonetaryValue  ::=  SEQUENCE {
                  currency              Iso4217CurrencyCode,
                  amount               INTEGER,
                  exponent             INTEGER }
            -- value = amount * 10^exponent
            

            QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
              statementId        OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
              statementInfo      ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL}
            

                   SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
                     semanticsIdentifier        OBJECT IDENTIFIER   OPTIONAL,
                     nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities
                                                                     OPTIONAL }
                     (WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
                      WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})
            
                 NameRegistrationAuthorities ::=  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                     GeneralName
             

             TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
               predefinedBiometricType   PredefinedBiometricType,
               biometricDataOid          OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
            
             PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
               picture(0),handwritten-signature(1)}
               (picture|handwritten-signature)
             

            ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING {
               unused(0),
               keyCompromise(1),
               cACompromise(2),
               affiliationChanged(3),
               superseded(4),
               cessationOfOperation(5),
               certficateHold(6)
            }
            

             RoleSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
                             roleAuthority  [0] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
                             roleName       [1] GeneralName
                       }
             

             RoleSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
                             roleAuthority  [0] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
                             roleName       [1] GeneralName
                       }
             

                 RSAPublicKey ::= Sequence {
                                     modulus Integer, -- n
                                     publicExponent Integer, -- e
                                 }
            

                  NameOrPseudonym ::= CHOICE {
                	   surAndGivenName SEQUENCE {
                	     surName DirectoryString,
                	     givenName SEQUENCE OF DirectoryString 
                    },
                	   pseudonym DirectoryString 
                  }
            

The sequence is of type NameOrPseudonym:

                  NameOrPseudonym ::= CHOICE {
                	   surAndGivenName SEQUENCE {
                	     surName DirectoryString,
                	     givenName SEQUENCE OF DirectoryString
                    },
                	   pseudonym DirectoryString
                  }
            

The sequence is of type NameOrPseudonym:

                   NameOrPseudonym ::= CHOICE {
                 	   surAndGivenName SEQUENCE {
                 	     surName DirectoryString,
                 	     givenName SEQUENCE OF DirectoryString
                     },
                 	   pseudonym DirectoryString
                   }
             

Returns:

                   NameOrPseudonym ::= CHOICE {
                 	   surAndGivenName SEQUENCE {
                 	     surName DirectoryString,
                 	     givenName SEQUENCE OF DirectoryString
                     },
                 	   pseudonym DirectoryString
                   }
             

                 PersonalData ::= SEQUENCE {
                   nameOrPseudonym NameOrPseudonym,
                   nameDistinguisher [0] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
                   dateOfBirth [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
                   placeOfBirth [2] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
                   gender [3] PrintableString OPTIONAL,
                   postalAddress [4] DirectoryString OPTIONAL
                   }
             

The sequence is of type NameOrPseudonym:

                 PersonalData ::= SEQUENCE {
                   nameOrPseudonym NameOrPseudonym,
                   nameDistinguisher [0] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
                   dateOfBirth [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
                   placeOfBirth [2] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
                   gender [3] PrintableString OPTIONAL,
                   postalAddress [4] DirectoryString OPTIONAL
                   }
             

Returns:

                 PersonalData ::= SEQUENCE {
                   nameOrPseudonym NameOrPseudonym,
                   nameDistinguisher [0] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
                   dateOfBirth [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
                   placeOfBirth [2] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
                   gender [3] PrintableString OPTIONAL,
                   postalAddress [4] DirectoryString OPTIONAL
                   }
             

                 SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= Attributes
                 Attributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
                 Attribute ::= SEQUENCE
                 {
                   type AttributeType
                   values SET OF AttributeValue
                 }
            
                 AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
                 AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType
             

                  SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= Attributes
                  Attributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
                  Attribute ::= SEQUENCE
                  {
                    type AttributeType
                    values SET OF AttributeValue
                  }
            
                  AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
                  AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType
             

                  SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= Attributes
                  Attributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
                  Attribute ::= SEQUENCE
                  {
                    type AttributeType
                    values SET OF AttributeValue
                  }
            
                  AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
                  AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType
             

            SubjectKeyIdentifier::= OCTET STRING
            

            (1) The keyIdentifier is composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the
            value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag,
            length, and number of unused bits).
            

            (2) The keyIdentifier is composed of a four bit type field with
            the value 0100 followed by the least significant 60 bits of the
            SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey.
            

The GetEncoded() method in the public keys in the JCE produces a DER encoded one of these.

            SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= Sequence {
                                     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
                                     publicKey BIT STRING }
            

                Target  ::= CHOICE {
                  targetName          [0] GeneralName,
                  targetGroup         [1] GeneralName,
                  targetCert          [2] TargetCert
                }
            

The targetCert field is currently not supported and must not be used according to RFC 3281.

obj can be a Target or a {@link Asn1TaggedObject}

Exactly one of the parameters must be not null.

                Target  ::= CHOICE {
                  targetName          [0] GeneralName,
                  targetGroup         [1] GeneralName,
                  targetCert          [2] TargetCert
                }
            

                      SEQUENCE OF Targets
            

obj can be a TargetInformation or a {@link Asn1Sequence}

The ArrayList is cloned before it is returned.

                     SEQUENCE OF Targets
            

According to RFC 3281 only one targets element must be produced. If multiple targets are given in the constructor they are merged into one targets element. If this was produced from a {@link Org.BouncyCastle.Asn1.Asn1Sequence} the encoding is kept.

                       Targets ::= SEQUENCE OF Target
                      
                       Target  ::= CHOICE {
                         targetName          [0] GeneralName,
                         targetGroup         [1] GeneralName,
                         targetCert          [2] TargetCert
                       }
                      
                       TargetCert  ::= SEQUENCE {
                         targetCertificate    IssuerSerial,
                         targetName           GeneralName OPTIONAL,
                         certDigestInfo       ObjectDigestInfo OPTIONAL
                       }
            

obj can be a Targets or a {@link Asn1Sequence}

The ArrayList is copied.

The ArrayList is cloned before it is returned.

                       Targets ::= SEQUENCE OF Target
            

            TbsCertificate ::= Sequence {
                 version          [ 0 ]  Version DEFAULT v1(0),
                 serialNumber            CertificateSerialNumber,
                 signature               AlgorithmIdentifier,
                 issuer                  Name,
                 validity                Validity,
                 subject                 Name,
                 subjectPublicKeyInfo    SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
                 issuerUniqueID    [ 1 ] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                 subjectUniqueID   [ 2 ] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                 extensions        [ 3 ] Extensions OPTIONAL
                 }
            

Note: issuerUniqueID and subjectUniqueID are both deprecated by the IETF. This class will parse them, but you really shouldn't be creating new ones.

            TbsCertList  ::=  Sequence  {
                 version                 Version OPTIONAL,
                                              -- if present, shall be v2
                 signature               AlgorithmIdentifier,
                 issuer                  Name,
                 thisUpdate              Time,
                 nextUpdate              Time OPTIONAL,
                 revokedCertificates     Sequence OF Sequence  {
                      userCertificate         CertificateSerialNumber,
                      revocationDate          Time,
                      crlEntryExtensions      Extensions OPTIONAL
                                                    -- if present, shall be v2
                                           }  OPTIONAL,
                 crlExtensions           [0]  EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
                                                    -- if present, shall be v2
                                           }
            

            Time ::= CHOICE {
                        utcTime        UTCTime,
                        generalTime    GeneralizedTime }
            

             UserNotice ::= Sequence {
                  noticeRef        NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
                  explicitText     DisplayText OPTIONAL}
            
             

Useful from reconstructing a UserNotice instance from its encodable/encoded form. @param as an ASN1Sequence value obtained from either calling @{link toASN1Object()} for a UserNotice instance or from parsing it from a DER-encoded stream.

             TbsCertificate ::= Sequence {
                  version          [ 0 ]  Version DEFAULT v1(0),
                  serialNumber            CertificateSerialNumber,
                  signature               AlgorithmIdentifier,
                  issuer                  Name,
                  validity                Validity,
                  subject                 Name,
                  subjectPublicKeyInfo    SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
                  }
             

             AttributeCertificateInfo ::= Sequence {
                   version              AttCertVersion -- version is v2,
                   holder               Holder,
                   issuer               AttCertIssuer,
                   signature            AlgorithmIdentifier,
                   serialNumber         CertificateSerialNumber,
                   attrCertValidityPeriod   AttCertValidityPeriod,
                   attributes           Sequence OF Attr,
                   issuerUniqueID       UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                   extensions           Extensions OPTIONAL
             }
             

             V2Form ::= Sequence {
                  issuerName            GeneralNames  OPTIONAL,
                  baseCertificateID     [0] IssuerSerial  OPTIONAL,
                  objectDigestInfo      [1] ObjectDigestInfo  OPTIONAL
                    -- issuerName MUST be present in this profile
                    -- baseCertificateID and objectDigestInfo MUST NOT
                    -- be present in this profile
             }
            

              TbsCertList  ::=  Sequence  {
                   version                 Version OPTIONAL,
                                                -- if present, shall be v2
                   signature               AlgorithmIdentifier,
                   issuer                  Name,
                   thisUpdate              Time,
                   nextUpdate              Time OPTIONAL,
                   revokedCertificates     Sequence OF Sequence  {
                        userCertificate         CertificateSerialNumber,
                        revocationDate          Time,
                        crlEntryExtensions      Extensions OPTIONAL
                                                      -- if present, shall be v2
                                             }  OPTIONAL,
                   crlExtensions           [0]  EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
                                                      -- if present, shall be v2
                                             }
             

             TbsCertificate ::= Sequence {
                  version          [ 0 ]  Version DEFAULT v1(0),
                  serialNumber            CertificateSerialNumber,
                  signature               AlgorithmIdentifier,
                  issuer                  Name,
                  validity                Validity,
                  subject                 Name,
                  subjectPublicKeyInfo    SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
                  issuerUniqueID    [ 1 ] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                  subjectUniqueID   [ 2 ] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                  extensions        [ 3 ] Extensions OPTIONAL
                  }
             

             Certificate ::= Sequence {
                 tbsCertificate          TbsCertificate,
                 signatureAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier,
                 signature               BIT STRING
             }
            

it's is assumed the table contains Oid/string pairs.

It's is assumed the table contains Oid/string pairs.

it's is assumed the table contains Oid/string pairs.

It's is assumed the table contains Oid/string pairs.

                 Extensions        ::=   SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension
            
                 Extension         ::=   SEQUENCE {
                    extnId            EXTENSION.&id ({ExtensionSet}),
                    critical          BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
                    extnValue         OCTET STRING }
             

                 RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
            
                 RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
            
                 AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
                                               type  OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                                               value ANY }
             

Note: if you're trying to be ultra orthodox, don't use this! It shouldn't be in here.

it's is assumed the table contains OID/string pairs, and the contents of the table are copied into an internal table as part of the construction process. The ordering ArrayList should contain the OIDs in the order they are meant to be encoded or printed in ToString.

it's is assumed the table contains OID/string pairs, and the contents of the table are copied into an internal table as part of the construction process. The ordering ArrayList should contain the OIDs in the order they are meant to be encoded or printed in ToString.

The passed in converter will be used to convert the strings into their ASN.1 counterparts.

The passed in converter will be used to convert the strings into their ASN.1 counterparts.

* An example of an encoder look like below: *

                 * public class X509DirEntryConverter
                 *     : X509NameEntryConverter
                 * {
                 *     public Asn1Object GetConvertedValue(
                 *         DerObjectIdentifier  oid,
                 *         string               value)
                 *     {
                 *         if (str.Length() != 0 && str.charAt(0) == '#')
                 *         {
                 *             return ConvertHexEncoded(str, 1);
                 *         }
                 *         if (oid.Equals(EmailAddress))
                 *         {
                 *             return new DerIA5String(str);
                 *         }
                 *         else if (CanBePrintable(str))
                 *         {
                 *             return new DerPrintableString(str);
                 *         }
                 *         else if (CanBeUTF8(str))
                 *         {
                 *             return new DerUtf8String(str);
                 *         }
                 *         else
                 *         {
                 *             return new DerBmpString(str);
                 *         }
                 *     }
                 * }
            	 * 

             KeySpecificInfo ::= Sequence {
                 algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                 counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
             }
            

             OtherInfo ::= Sequence {
                 keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
                 partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
                 suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
             }
            

            Parameters ::= CHOICE {
               ecParameters ECParameters,
               namedCurve   CURVES.&id({CurveNames}),
               implicitlyCA Null
            }
            

             Curve ::= Sequence {
                 a               FieldElement,
                 b               FieldElement,
                 seed            BIT STRING      OPTIONAL
             }
            

             ECParameters ::= Sequence {
                 version         Integer { ecpVer1(1) } (ecpVer1),
                 fieldID         FieldID {{FieldTypes}},
                 curve           X9Curve,
                 base            X9ECPoint,
                 order           Integer,
                 cofactor        Integer OPTIONAL
             }
            

             ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
            

Octet string produced using ECPoint.GetEncoded().

             FieldElement ::= OCTET STRING
            

1. if q is an odd prime then the field element is processed as an Integer and converted to an octet string according to x 9.62 4.3.1.
2. if q is 2^m then the bit string contained in the field element is converted into an octet string with the same ordering padded at the front if necessary.

             FieldID ::= Sequence {
                 fieldType       FIELD-ID.&id({IOSet}),
                 parameters      FIELD-ID.&Type({IOSet}{@fieldType})
             }
            

Format documented here: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=blob;f=agent/keyformat.txt;h=42c4b1f06faf1bbe71ffadc2fee0fad6bec91a97;hb=refs/heads/master

                  CMSAuthenticatedDataGenerator  fact = new CMSAuthenticatedDataGenerator();
            
                  fact.addKeyTransRecipient(cert);
            
                  CMSAuthenticatedData         data = fact.generate(content, algorithm, "BC");
             

Note: that because we are in a streaming mode only one recipient can be tried and it is important that the methods on the parser are called in the appropriate order.

Example of use - assuming the first recipient matches the private key we have.

                  CMSAuthenticatedDataParser     ad = new CMSAuthenticatedDataParser(inputStream);
            
                  RecipientInformationStore  recipients = ad.getRecipientInfos();
            
                  Collection  c = recipients.getRecipients();
                  Iterator    it = c.iterator();
            
                  if (it.hasNext())
                  {
                      RecipientInformation   recipient = (RecipientInformation)it.next();
            
                      CMSTypedStream recData = recipient.getContentStream(privateKey, "BC");
            
                      processDataStream(recData.getContentStream());
            
                      if (!Arrays.equals(ad.getMac(), recipient.getMac())
                      {
                          System.err.println("Data corrupted!!!!");
                      }
                  }
              

                      CMSAuthenticatedDataParser     ep = new CMSAuthenticatedDataParser(new BufferedInputStream(inputStream, bufSize));
              

A simple example of usage.

                  CMSAuthenticatedDataStreamGenerator edGen = new CMSAuthenticatedDataStreamGenerator();
            
                  edGen.addKeyTransRecipient(cert);
            
                  ByteArrayOutputStream  bOut = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
            
                  OutputStream out = edGen.open(
                                          bOut, CMSAuthenticatedDataGenerator.AES128_CBC, "BC");*
                  out.write(data);
            
                  out.close();
             

* A simple example of usage.

*

                *      CMSCompressedDataGenerator fact = new CMSCompressedDataGenerator();
                *      CMSCompressedData data = fact.Generate(content, algorithm);
                * 

                 CMSCompressedDataParser cp = new CMSCompressedDataParser(inputStream);
            
                 process(cp.GetContent().GetContentStream());
             

                  CMSCompressedDataParser     ep = new CMSCompressedDataParser(new BufferedInputStream(inputStream, bufSize));
              

A simple example of usage.

                  CMSCompressedDataStreamGenerator gen = new CMSCompressedDataStreamGenerator();
            
                  Stream cOut = gen.Open(outputStream, CMSCompressedDataStreamGenerator.ZLIB);
            
                  cOut.Write(data);
            
                  cOut.Close();
             

Note: that because we are in a streaming mode only one recipient can be tried and it is important that the methods on the parser are called in the appropriate order.

Example of use - assuming the first recipient matches the private key we have.

                  CmsEnvelopedDataParser     ep = new CmsEnvelopedDataParser(inputStream);
            
                  RecipientInformationStore  recipients = ep.GetRecipientInfos();
            
                  Collection  c = recipients.getRecipients();
                  Iterator    it = c.iterator();
            
                  if (it.hasNext())
                  {
                      RecipientInformation   recipient = (RecipientInformation)it.next();
            
                      CMSTypedStream recData = recipient.getContentStream(privateKey);
            
                      processDataStream(recData.getContentStream());
                  }
              

                      CmsEnvelopedDataParser     ep = new CmsEnvelopedDataParser(new BufferedInputStream(inputStream, bufSize));
              

A simple example of usage.

                  CmsEnvelopedDataStreamGenerator edGen = new CmsEnvelopedDataStreamGenerator();
            
                  edGen.AddKeyTransRecipient(cert);
            
                  MemoryStream  bOut = new MemoryStream();
            
                  Stream out = edGen.Open(
                                          bOut, CMSEnvelopedDataGenerator.AES128_CBC);*
                  out.Write(data);
            
                  out.Close();
             

                  CMSEnvelopedDataGenerator  fact = new CMSEnvelopedDataGenerator();
            
                  fact.addKeyTransRecipient(cert);
            
                  CMSEnvelopedData         data = fact.generate(content, algorithm, "BC");
             

              IX509Store              certs = s.GetCertificates();
              SignerInformationStore  signers = s.GetSignerInfos();
            
              foreach (SignerInformation signer in signers.GetSigners())
              {
                  ArrayList       certList = new ArrayList(certs.GetMatches(signer.SignerID));
                  X509Certificate cert = (X509Certificate) certList[0];
            
                  if (signer.Verify(cert.GetPublicKey()))
                  {
                      verified++;
                  }
              }
             

* A simple example of usage. * *

                 *      IX509Store certs...
                 *      IX509Store crls...
                 *      CmsSignedDataGenerator gen = new CmsSignedDataGenerator();
                 *
                 *      gen.AddSigner(privKey, cert, CmsSignedGenerator.DigestSha1);
                 *      gen.AddCertificates(certs);
                 *      gen.AddCrls(crls);
                 *
                 *      CmsSignedData data = gen.Generate(content);
                 * 

Note: that because we are in a streaming mode only one signer can be tried and it is important that the methods on the parser are called in the appropriate order.

A simple example of usage for an encapsulated signature.

Two notes: first, in the example below the validity of the certificate isn't verified, just the fact that one of the certs matches the given signer, and, second, because we are in a streaming mode the order of the operations is important.

                  CmsSignedDataParser     sp = new CmsSignedDataParser(encapSigData);
            
                  sp.GetSignedContent().Drain();
            
                  IX509Store              certs = sp.GetCertificates();
                  SignerInformationStore  signers = sp.GetSignerInfos();
            
                  foreach (SignerInformation signer in signers.GetSigners())
                  {
                      ArrayList       certList = new ArrayList(certs.GetMatches(signer.SignerID));
                      X509Certificate cert = (X509Certificate) certList[0];
            
                      Console.WriteLine("verify returns: " + signer.Verify(cert));
                  }
             

                      CmsSignedDataParser     ep = new CmsSignedDataParser(new BufferedInputStream(encapSigData, bufSize));
              

The output stream is returned unclosed.

The output stream is returned unclosed.

A simple example of usage.

                  IX509Store                   certs...
                  CmsSignedDataStreamGenerator gen = new CmsSignedDataStreamGenerator();
            
                  gen.AddSigner(privateKey, cert, CmsSignedDataStreamGenerator.DIGEST_SHA1);
            
                  gen.AddCertificates(certs);
            
                  Stream sigOut = gen.Open(bOut);
            
                  sigOut.Write(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("Hello World!"));
            
                  sigOut.Close();
             

note: This uses MTI/A0 key agreement in order to make the key agreement secure against passive attacks. If you're doing Diffie-Hellman and both parties have long term public keys you should look at using this. For further information have a look at RFC 2631.

It's possible to extend this to more than two parties as well, for the moment that is left as an exercise for the reader.

note: This is only the basic algorithm, it doesn't take advantage of long term public keys if they are available. See the DHAgreement class for a "better" implementation.

Note: As stated P1363 compatibility mode with ECDH can be preset, and in this case the implementation doesn't have a ECDH compatibility mode (if you want that just use ECDHBasicAgreement and note they both implement BasicAgreement!).

Note: in the case where the underlying cipher is either a CFB cipher or an OFB one the last block may not be a multiple of the block size.

BLAKE2s offers a built-in keying mechanism to be used directly for authentication ("Prefix-MAC") rather than a HMAC construction.

BLAKE2s offers a built-in support for a salt for randomized hashing and a personal string for defining a unique hash function for each application.

BLAKE2s is optimized for 32-bit platforms and produces digests of any size between 1 and 32 bytes. BLAKE2s Initialization Vector Message word permutations Whenever this buffer overflows, it will be processed in the Compress() function. For performance issues, long messages will not use this buffer. Position of last inserted byte Internal state, in the BLAKE2 paper it is called v State vector, in the BLAKE2 paper it is called h holds least significant bits of counter holds most significant bits of counter finalization flag, for last block: ~0 BLAKE2s-256 for hashing. BLAKE2s for hashing. @param digestBits the desired digest length in bits. Must be a multiple of 8 and less than 256. BLAKE2s for authentication ("Prefix-MAC mode").

After calling the doFinal() method, the key will remain to be used for further computations of this instance. The key can be overwritten using the clearKey() method. @param key a key up to 32 bytes or null BLAKE2s with key, required digest length, salt and personalization.

After calling the doFinal() method, the key, the salt and the personal string will remain and might be used for further computations with this instance. The key can be overwritten using the clearKey() method, the salt (pepper) can be overwritten using the clearSalt() method. @param key a key up to 32 bytes or null @param digestBytes from 1 up to 32 bytes @param salt 8 bytes or null @param personalization 8 bytes or null Update the message digest with a single byte. @param b the input byte to be entered. Update the message digest with a block of bytes. @param message the byte array containing the data. @param offset the offset into the byte array where the data starts. @param len the length of the data. Close the digest, producing the final digest value. The doFinal() call leaves the digest reset. Key, salt and personal string remain. @param out the array the digest is to be copied into. @param outOffset the offset into the out array the digest is to start at. Reset the digest back to its initial state. The key, the salt and the personal string will remain for further computations. Return the algorithm name. @return the algorithm name Return the size in bytes of the digest produced by this message digest. @return the size in bytes of the digest produced by this message digest. Return the size in bytes of the internal buffer the digest applies its compression function to. @return byte length of the digest's internal buffer. Overwrite the key if it is no longer used (zeroization). Overwrite the salt (pepper) if it is secret and no longer used (zeroization). implementation of Ukrainian DSTU 7564 hash function base implementation of MD4 family style digest as outlined in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography", pages 344 - 347. implementation of GOST R 34.11-94 Standard constructor Constructor to allow use of a particular sbox with GOST28147 @see GOST28147Engine#getSBox(String) Copy constructor. This will copy the state of the provided message digest. reset the chaining variables to the IV values.

NOTE: This algorithm is only included for backwards compatibility with legacy applications, it's not secure, don't use it for anything new!

                    block  word  digest
            SHA-1   512    32    160
            SHA-224 512    32    224
            SHA-256 512    32    256
            SHA-384 1024   64    384
            SHA-512 1024   64    512
            

                     block  word  digest
             SHA-1   512    32    160
             SHA-256 512    32    256
             SHA-384 1024   64    384
             SHA-512 1024   64    512
             

                     block  word  digest
             SHA-1   512    32    160
             SHA-256 512    32    256
             SHA-384 1024   64    384
             SHA-512 1024   64    512
             

                     block  word  digest
             SHA-1   512    32    160
             SHA-256 512    32    256
             SHA-384 1024   64    384
             SHA-512 1024   64    512
             

The static property is checked during construction of the encoding object, it is set to true by default.

For further details see: http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/. This implementation is based on optimizations from Dr. Brian Gladman's paper and C code at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/cryptography_technology/rijndael/ There are three levels of tradeoff of speed vs memory Because java has no preprocessor, they are written as three separate classes from which to choose The fastest uses 8Kbytes of static tables to precompute round calculations, 4 256 word tables for encryption and 4 for decryption. The middle performance version uses only one 256 word table for each, for a total of 2Kbytes, adding 12 rotate operations per round to compute the values contained in the other tables from the contents of the first. The slowest version uses no static tables at all and computes the values in each round.

This file contains the middle performance version with 2Kbytes of static tables for round precomputation.

For further details see: http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/. This implementation is based on optimizations from Dr. Brian Gladman's paper and C code at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/cryptography_technology/rijndael/ There are three levels of tradeoff of speed vs memory Because java has no preprocessor), they are written as three separate classes from which to choose The fastest uses 8Kbytes of static tables to precompute round calculations), 4 256 word tables for encryption and 4 for decryption. The middle performance version uses only one 256 word table for each), for a total of 2Kbytes), adding 12 rotate operations per round to compute the values contained in the other tables from the contents of the first The slowest version uses no static tables at all and computes the values in each round

This file contains the fast version with 8Kbytes of static tables for round precomputation

For further details see: http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/. This implementation is based on optimizations from Dr. Brian Gladman's paper and C code at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/cryptography_technology/rijndael/ There are three levels of tradeoff of speed vs memory Because java has no preprocessor, they are written as three separate classes from which to choose The fastest uses 8Kbytes of static tables to precompute round calculations, 4 256 word tables for encryption and 4 for decryption. The middle performance version uses only one 256 word table for each, for a total of 2Kbytes, adding 12 rotate operations per round to compute the values contained in the other tables from the contents of the first The slowest version uses no static tables at all and computes the values in each round.

This file contains the slowest performance version with no static tables for round precomputation, but it has the smallest foot print.

* Note: *

*
• this is based on a draft, and as such is subject to change - don't use this class for anything requiring long term storage.
*
• if you are using this to wrap triple-des keys you need to set the * parity bits on the key and, if it's a two-key triple-des key, pad it * yourself.
*

http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/p3ciphers/hc/hc128_p3.pdf

It is a third phase candidate in the eStream contest, and is patent-free. No attacks are known as of today (April 2007). See http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/hcp3.html

http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/p3ciphers/hc/hc256_p3.pdf

Its brother, HC-128, is a third phase candidate in the eStream contest. The algorithm is patent-free. No attacks are known as of today (April 2007). See http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/hcp3.html

This implementation is based on the "HOWTO: INTERNATIONAL DATA ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM" implementation summary by Fauzan Mirza (F.U.Mirza@sheffield.ac.uk). (barring 1 typo at the end of the MulInv function!).

It can be found at ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/cryptography/symmetric/idea/

Note: This algorithm was patented in the USA, Japan and Europe. These patents expired in 2011/2012.

i.e. x * MulInv(x) == 1 (modulo BASE)

i.e. x + AddInv(x) == 0

This implementation has a word size of 32 bits.

This implementation is set to work with a 64 bit word size.

Tnepres is based on Serpent which was designed by Ross Anderson, Eli Biham and Lars Knudsen as a candidate algorithm for the NIST AES Quest. Unfortunately there was an endianness issue with test vectors in the AES submission and the resulting confusion lead to the Tnepres cipher as well, which is a byte swapped version of Serpent.

For full details see The Serpent home page

*

                    * G(x) = x^4 + (a+1/a)x^3 + ax^2 + (a+1/a)x + 1
                    * 

This implementation does not correspondent to the 1999 published paper "A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme" of Niels Provos and David Mazières, see: https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/usenix99/provos/provos_html/node1.html. In contrast to the paper, the order of key setup and salt setup is reversed: state <- ExpandKey(state, 0, key) state %lt;- ExpandKey(state, 0, salt) This corresponds to the OpenBSD reference implementation of Bcrypt.

Note: There is no successful cryptanalysis (status 2015), but the amount of memory and the band width of Bcrypt may be insufficient to effectively prevent attacks with custom hardware like FPGAs, ASICs

This implementation uses some parts of Bouncy Castle's BlowfishEngine.

This implements the raw bcrypt function as defined in the bcrypt specification, not the crypt encoded version implemented in OpenBSD.

Note: can take a while...

This Generates keys consistent for use with ElGamal as described in page 164 of "Handbook of Applied Cryptography".

* Note: can take a while... *

The scheme is a simple extension of PKCS 5 V2.0 Scheme 1 using MD5 with an iteration count of 1.

The document this implementation is based on can be found at RSA's Pkcs12 Page

The document this implementation is based on can be found at RSA's Pkcs5 Page

The document this implementation is based on can be found at RSA's Pkcs5 Page

doFinal leaves the MAC in the same state it was after the last init.

Note: the size of the MAC must be at least 24 bits (FIPS Publication 81), or 16 bits if being used as a data authenticator (FIPS Publication 113), and in general should be less than the size of the block cipher as it reduces the chance of an exhaustive attack (see Handbook of Applied Cryptography).

Note: the size of the MAC must be at least 24 bits (FIPS Publication 81), or 16 bits if being used as a data authenticator (FIPS Publication 113), and in general should be less than the size of the block cipher as it reduces the chance of an exhaustive attack (see Handbook of Applied Cryptography).

Note: the size of the MAC must be at least 24 bits (FIPS Publication 81), or 16 bits if being used as a data authenticator (FIPS Publication 113), and in general should be less than the size of the block cipher as it reduces the chance of an exhaustive attack (see Handbook of Applied Cryptography).

Note: the size of the MAC must be at least 24 bits (FIPS Publication 81), or 16 bits if being used as a data authenticator (FIPS Publication 113), and in general should be less than the size of the block cipher as it reduces the chance of an exhaustive attack (see Handbook of Applied Cryptography).

CMAC is analogous to OMAC1 - see also en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CMAC

CMAC is a NIST recomendation - see csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/modes/800-38_Series_Publications/SP800-38B.pdf

CMAC/OMAC1 is a blockcipher-based message authentication code designed and analyzed by Tetsu Iwata and Kaoru Kurosawa.

CMAC/OMAC1 is a simple variant of the CBC MAC (Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code). OMAC stands for One-Key CBC MAC.

It supports 128- or 64-bits block ciphers, with any key size, and returns a MAC with dimension less or equal to the block size of the underlying cipher.

Note: the size of the MAC must be at least 24 bits (FIPS Publication 81), or 16 bits if being used as a data authenticator (FIPS Publication 113), and in general should be less than the size of the block cipher as it reduces the chance of an exhaustive attack (see Handbook of Applied Cryptography). @param cipher the cipher to be used as the basis of the MAC generation. @param macSizeInBits the size of the MAC in bits, must be a multiple of 8 and @lt;= 128. Reset the mac generator.

Note: the size of the MAC must be at least 24 bits (FIPS Publication 81), or 16 bits if being used as a data authenticator (FIPS Publication 113), and in general should be less than the size of the block cipher as it reduces the chance of an exhaustive attack (see Handbook of Applied Cryptography).

Note: the size of the MAC must be at least 24 bits (FIPS Publication 81), or 16 bits if being used as a data authenticator (FIPS Publication 113), and in general should be less than the size of the block cipher as it reduces the chance of an exhaustive attack (see Handbook of Applied Cryptography).

Note: this mode is a packet mode - it needs all the data up front.

License for Open-Source Software Implementations of OCB (Jan 9, 2013) - 'License 1'
Under this license, you are authorized to make, use, and distribute open-source software implementations of OCB. This license terminates for you if you sue someone over their open-source software implementation of OCB claiming that you have a patent covering their implementation.

This is a non-binding summary of a legal document (the link above). The parameters of the license are specified in the license document and that document is controlling.

* For further info see RFC 2440. *

See "Applied Cryptography" by Bruce Schneier for more information.

Internal access to the digest is synchronized so a single one of these can be shared.

Minimum entropy requirement is the security strength requested.

Minimum entropy requirement is the security strength requested.

Minimum entropy requirement is the security strength requested.

Any SecureRandom created from a builder constructed like this will make use of input passed to SecureRandom.setSeed() if the default SecureRandom does for its generateSeed() call.

Any SecureRandom created from a builder constructed like this will make use of input passed to SecureRandom.setSeed() if the passed in SecureRandom does for its generateSeed() call.

Note: If this constructor is used any calls to setSeed() in the resulting SecureRandom will be ignored.

Based on an idea from Marcus Lippert.

If fast is set to true, the code should be round about 8 times faster when generating a long sequence of random bytes. 20 bytes of random values using the fast mode take less than half a second on a Nokia e70. If fast is set to false, it takes round about 2500 ms.

Any SecureRandom created from a builder constructed like this will make use of input passed to SecureRandom.setSeed() if the default SecureRandom does for its generateSeed() call.

Any SecureRandom created from a builder constructed like this will make use of input passed to SecureRandom.setSeed() if the passed in SecureRandom does for its generateSeed() call.

Note: If this constructor is used any calls to setSeed() in the resulting SecureRandom will be ignored.

The message digest hash, H, is encapsulated to form a byte string as follows

            EB = 06 || PS || 0xBA || H || TRAILER
            

             opaque ASN.1Cert<2^24-1>;
            
             struct {
                 ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
             } Certificate;
             

             struct {
                 ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
                 DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<3..2^16-1>
             } CertificateRequest;
             

Support fast rejection of duplicate records by maintaining a sliding receive window Check whether a received record with the given sequence number should be rejected as a duplicate. @param seq the 48-bit DTLSPlainText.sequence_number field of a received record. @return true if the record should be discarded without further processing. Report that a received record with the given sequence number passed authentication checks. @param seq the 48-bit DTLSPlainText.sequence_number field of an authenticated record. When a new epoch begins, sequence numbers begin again at 0

The method will handle fragmentation internally. @param buf The buffer with the data. @param offset The position in the buffer where the data is placed. @param len The length of the data. @throws IOException If something goes wrong during sending.

From Knuth Vol 2, pg 395.

             OcspRequest     ::=     SEQUENCE {
                   tbsRequest                  TBSRequest,
                   optionalSignature   [0]     EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
            
               TBSRequest      ::=     SEQUENCE {
                   version             [0]     EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
                   requestorName       [1]     EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
                   requestList                 SEQUENCE OF Request,
                   requestExtensions   [2]     EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
            
               Signature       ::=     SEQUENCE {
                   signatureAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier,
                   signature               BIT STRING,
                   certs               [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL}
            
               Version         ::=             INTEGER  {  v1(0) }
            
               Request         ::=     SEQUENCE {
                   reqCert                     CertID,
                   singleRequestExtensions     [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
            
               CertID          ::=     SEQUENCE {
                   hashAlgorithm       AlgorithmIdentifier,
                   issuerNameHash      OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuer's DN
                   issuerKeyHash       OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuers public key
                   serialNumber        CertificateSerialNumber }
             

In the case of PKCS7 objects the reader will return a CMS ContentInfo object. Keys and Certificates will be returned using the appropriate java.security type.